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The	 ﾠEpistemic	 ﾠImpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEtiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠExperience
*	 ﾠ
Susanna	 ﾠSiegel	 ﾠ
forthcoming	 ﾠin	 ﾠPhilosophical	 ﾠStudies	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsymposium	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Down	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠunconscious	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠunfold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgive	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
conscious	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠI	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠcan	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
experience.	 ﾠ
Suppose	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠany	 ﾠmustard	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge.	 ﾠ	 ﾠYou	 ﾠopen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
door	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook.	 ﾠThere’s	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmustard,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠhalf-ﾭ‐empty	 ﾠjar,	 ﾠsitting	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge	 ﾠdoor.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠfar,	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge	 ﾠhas	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠyou	 ﾠexcellent	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠmustard	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge.	 ﾠHaving	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠnotion,	 ﾠtied	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve.	 ﾠ
Sticking	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠnotion,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyour	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠjustification,	 ﾠor	 ﾠequivalently,	 ﾠrational	 ﾠor	 ﾠevidential	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠp.
1	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠvery	 ﾠgrammar	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“perceptual	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠjustification”	 ﾠcan	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
presuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthis	 ﾠall	 ﾠby	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsuffice	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso,	 ﾠ
absent	 ﾠdefeaters.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠread	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrammar.	 ﾠRead	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠallows	 ﾠ(but	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠentail)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠmight	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠp,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠof	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠfactors,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠother	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠ
besides	 ﾠp,	 ﾠor	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠetiological	 ﾠfeatures,	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠhad	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
right	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠconditions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Back	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkitchen,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠyou’re	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠhallucinating.	 ﾠIntuitively,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠnow	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
less	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠmustard	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge.	 ﾠRelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbaseline	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠpretty	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠour	 ﾠeyes,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠdowngraded	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠis	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠmaybe	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
eliminated.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠis	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbaseline,	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠdowngraded.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ
*	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠgrateful	 ﾠto	 ﾠmany	 ﾠaudiences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠgave	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠ(often	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠEpistemic	 ﾠ
Impact	 ﾠof	 ﾠReasoning	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBasement”)	 ﾠat	 ﾠANU,	 ﾠBarcelona,	 ﾠBarnard,	 ﾠBrandeis,	 ﾠBrown,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChapel	 ﾠHill	 ﾠColloquium,	 ﾠ
Toronto,	 ﾠCornell,	 ﾠMiami,	 ﾠNYU,	 ﾠSt	 ﾠAndrews,	 ﾠTexas,	 ﾠand	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠOntario.	 ﾠSpecial	 ﾠthanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠStew	 ﾠCohen,	 ﾠEric	 ﾠ
Mandelbaum,	 ﾠNico	 ﾠSilins	 ﾠand	 ﾠJonathan	 ﾠVogel	 ﾠfor	 ﾠextended	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠKeith	 ﾠPayne	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsharing	 ﾠhis	 ﾠresearch,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
John	 ﾠBengson,	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠChristensen,	 ﾠJosh	 ﾠDever,	 ﾠCarrie	 ﾠJenkins,	 ﾠMatthias	 ﾠJenny,	 ﾠSimon	 ﾠLeen,	 ﾠJim	 ﾠPryor,	 ﾠEric	 ﾠRowe,	 ﾠ
George	 ﾠSalmieri,	 ﾠJosh	 ﾠSchechter,	 ﾠScott	 ﾠSturgeon,	 ﾠJonathan	 ﾠWeisberg,	 ﾠand	 ﾠRu	 ﾠYe	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠhelpful	 ﾠreactions.	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠterminological	 ﾠremarks.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠI	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ“experience”	 ﾠto	 ﾠabbreviate	 ﾠ“perceptual	 ﾠexperience”,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
category	 ﾠthat	 ﾠencompasses	 ﾠhallucinations	 ﾠand	 ﾠillusions	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠveridical	 ﾠperceptions,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
excludes	 ﾠbodily	 ﾠsensations	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠpains	 ﾠand	 ﾠtickles.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ“evidence”,	 ﾠ
“justification”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“rational	 ﾠsupport”	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠinterchangeably	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠhere)	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
controversial.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠLycan	 ﾠ(1988)	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconservative	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheory-ﾭ‐choice	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit,	 ﾠand	 ﾠFoley	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠ
distinguishes	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠnotions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvicinity.	 ﾠI	 ﾠleave	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠreaders	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
oppose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconflation	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠnotion,	 ﾠif	 ﾠany,	 ﾠis	 ﾠbest	 ﾠsuited	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
discussion.	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ When	 ﾠyou	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyou’re	 ﾠhallucinating,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
experience:	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisturbance	 ﾠin	 ﾠyour	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdidn’t	 ﾠarise	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠany	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmustard.	 ﾠExperiences	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠless	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠsee,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
relatively	 ﾠmore	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠendogenous	 ﾠcause	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhallucination.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠparadigm	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade,	 ﾠyou’re	 ﾠaware	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyour	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
nonstandard	 ﾠetiology.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠyou	 ﾠweren’t	 ﾠaware	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthat	 ﾠetiology.	 ﾠWould	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
etiology	 ﾠby	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠyour	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠit,	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠan	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade?	 ﾠOne	 ﾠ
sentiment	 ﾠhere	 ﾠfavors	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠunwitting	 ﾠhallucination	 ﾠcould	 ﾠstill	 ﾠgive	 ﾠyou	 ﾠpretty	 ﾠgood	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠmustard	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfalse.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠmay	 ﾠpull	 ﾠmore	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠof	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠ
downgrade,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthose	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠremain	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠken.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠ
consider	 ﾠa	 ﾠfear-ﾭ‐ridden	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠsuspects	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun	 ﾠin	 ﾠher	 ﾠfridge.	 ﾠShe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
evidence	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠfor	 ﾠher	 ﾠsuspicion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprospect	 ﾠfrightens	 ﾠher	 ﾠshe	 ﾠopens	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
check	 ﾠinside.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠinside,	 ﾠher	 ﾠsuspicion	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠher	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠas	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun.	 ﾠ
Can	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfear-ﾭ‐ridden	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐experience	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠto	 ﾠconfirm	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsuspicion	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠplace?	 ﾠAs	 ﾠtheorists,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
can’t.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfear-ﾭ‐ridden	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠmay	 ﾠregard	 ﾠherself	 ﾠas	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠlooked	 ﾠvery	 ﾠcarefully,	 ﾠand	 ﾠseen	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
gun;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠthings	 ﾠmay	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠher,	 ﾠby	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge,	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠacquired	 ﾠmuch,	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠany,	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠafraid.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgun	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠvisual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠare	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠby	 ﾠfear	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuspicion	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceiver	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠshe	 ﾠeven	 ﾠlooked	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠother	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠprior	 ﾠstates	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell:	 ﾠoutright	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠ
expectations,	 ﾠdesires,	 ﾠhopes,	 ﾠwishes,	 ﾠdoubts,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠtickles	 ﾠor	 ﾠitches.	 ﾠHere	 ﾠare	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
hypothetical	 ﾠexamples:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Anger:	 ﾠBefore	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠJack,	 ﾠJill	 ﾠfears	 ﾠthat	 ﾠJack	 ﾠis	 ﾠangry	 ﾠat	 ﾠher.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠsees	 ﾠhim,	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ fear	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠher	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠvisual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠangry	 ﾠto	 ﾠher.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Preformationism:	 ﾠSome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠusers	 ﾠof	 ﾠmicroscopes	 ﾠwere	 ﾠspermist	 ﾠ
preformationists	 ﾠwho	 ﾠfavored	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsperm	 ﾠcells	 ﾠcontained	 ﾠembryos,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
claimed	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠembryos	 ﾠin	 ﾠsperm	 ﾠcells	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠlooked	 ﾠat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcells	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
microscope.
2	 ﾠLet’s	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠhad	 ﾠembryo-ﾭ‐content.	 ﾠ
Pliers:	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠprimed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpictures	 ﾠof	 ﾠBlack	 ﾠmen,	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠmore	 ﾠoften	 ﾠ
misclassify	 ﾠa	 ﾠtool	 ﾠ(pliers)	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠasked	 ﾠto	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠby	 ﾠkeystroke	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ200	 ﾠms	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠone	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠ(they’re	 ﾠtold	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsee	 ﾠeither	 ﾠone	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother),	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠprimed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpictures	 ﾠof	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠmen.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
experiment	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsettle	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpliers	 ﾠlook	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
pressing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘gun’	 ﾠkey,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠlet	 ﾠus	 ﾠstipulate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠupon	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpliers,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun.
3	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠFor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠamusing	 ﾠepisode	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠembryology	 ﾠsee	 ﾠPinto-ﾭ‐Correira	 ﾠ(1997).	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠPayne	 ﾠ(2001).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstipulation	 ﾠis	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠcontrary	 ﾠto	 ﾠfact.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠan	 ﾠunpublished	 ﾠfollow-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠ
done	 ﾠby	 ﾠPayne,	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠwere	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠprimes	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠstimuli	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Ouija	 ﾠboard:	 ﾠJack	 ﾠis	 ﾠtold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠOuija	 ﾠboards	 ﾠare	 ﾠunreliable	 ﾠbut	 ﾠtrusts	 ﾠthem	 ﾠanyway	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwants	 ﾠto.	 ﾠHis	 ﾠboard	 ﾠtells	 ﾠhim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe’s	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠ
described	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠhe’s	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠhe	 ﾠforms	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠsee	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠexpectation	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐experience	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠshown	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpicture.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Pessimism:	 ﾠBeset	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠmood	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠpessimism),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠyou	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠwear	 ﾠdispleased,	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠexpressions	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfaces.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
I’ll	 ﾠcall	 ﾠ‘cognitive	 ﾠpenetration’	 ﾠinfluences	 ﾠon	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠby	 ﾠprior	 ﾠmental	 ﾠstates	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠ(so	 ﾠ‘cognitive’	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠencompassing	 ﾠstates	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtraditionally	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
cognition).
4	 ﾠCognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠlater,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrough	 ﾠidea	 ﾠis	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnow.	 ﾠI’ll	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠare	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration,	 ﾠso	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠphenomenal	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstipulation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠat	 ﾠissue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ One	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠany	 ﾠprincipled	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠholding	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠintuitions	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠalone	 ﾠintroduces	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrades.	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthe	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
cognitively	 ﾠpenetrated	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠremoves	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠforce	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
otherwise	 ﾠhave,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplain	 ﾠold	 ﾠhallucination	 ﾠremains	 ﾠimmune	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠany	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
downgrade	 ﾠby	 ﾠits	 ﾠetiology?	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠare	 ﾠsuboptimal,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
first	 ﾠsuboptimal	 ﾠkind	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠway?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠI	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes.	 ﾠExperiences,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠ
etiologies.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠpenetrated	 ﾠmustard-ﾭ‐experience	 ﾠis	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠdowngraded,	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
experiment,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠafter	 ﾠeach	 ﾠtrial,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠasked	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthey	 ﾠreached	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠverdict	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstimulus	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠtool	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠtime	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwanted	 ﾠto	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthree	 ﾠoptions	 ﾠa,	 ﾠlabeled	 ﾠby	 ﾠSEE	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ‘saw	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstimulus	 ﾠor	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠit’),	 ﾠKNOW	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
did	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstimulus	 ﾠbut	 ﾠjust	 ﾠknew	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas),	 ﾠor	 ﾠGUESS	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
guessing	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠshown	 ﾠa	 ﾠtool	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun).	 ﾠParticipants	 ﾠwho	 ﾠselected	 ﾠSEE	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠcategorization	 ﾠerrors,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmade	 ﾠstereotype-ﾭ‐consistent	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠ
(misidentifying	 ﾠtools	 ﾠfor	 ﾠguns)	 ﾠoverwhelmingly	 ﾠselected	 ﾠKNOW	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠtrials.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtake	 ﾠ
participants’	 ﾠreports	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠat	 ﾠface	 ﾠvalue,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthese	 ﾠresults	 ﾠcount	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠkind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐
experience.	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠI	 ﾠapply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠin	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠFodor	 ﾠ(1983)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(1984)	 ﾠand	 ﾠPylyshyn	 ﾠ(1999),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠis	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠto	 ﾠearly	 ﾠvision.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠ
Pylyshyn	 ﾠ(1998)	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠvision	 ﾠis	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠimpenetrable,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠearly	 ﾠvision	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
exclusively	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodule	 ﾠin	 ﾠFodor’s	 ﾠ(1983)	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠstates	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠits	 ﾠoutputs	 ﾠmaybe	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠlearning).	 ﾠCognitive	 ﾠ
penetration	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠsense	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠimpenetrability	 ﾠin	 ﾠFodor’s	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Pylyshyn’s,	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠvisual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexhausted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutputs	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
early	 ﾠvision.	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
virtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠarising	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠan	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠplain	 ﾠold	 ﾠhallucinations,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
induced	 ﾠby	 ﾠdrugs,	 ﾠarise	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠor	 ﾠas	 ﾠI’ll	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠzaplike.
5	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Some	 ﾠreliabilists	 ﾠabout	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhappily	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
kinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuboptimal	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠreason	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
times:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠleading	 ﾠreliably	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠbeliefs.
6	 ﾠFor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpurposes,	 ﾠit	 ﾠisn’t	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠto	 ﾠreach	 ﾠa	 ﾠverdict	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠplain	 ﾠold	 ﾠhallucinations	 ﾠdo	 ﾠor	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠ
epistemic	 ﾠdowngrades.
7	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠI’ll	 ﾠargue,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠthing	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
irrational	 ﾠetiology,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbarring	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
assimilation	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠto	 ﾠreliability,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠis	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
unreliability.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternalist	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
justification,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠphenomenal	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
bestow	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠpower	 ﾠon	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠI’ll	 ﾠelaborate	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠand	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠentail	 ﾠany	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠand	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠ
experiences.	 ﾠExperiences	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠor	 ﾠunjustified,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠor	 ﾠevidentially	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐supported	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐supported.
8	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessed	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠodds	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠelaborating	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠupshot	 ﾠin	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠI	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠPrinciple	 ﾠin	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠlinks	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
kinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠpenetrated	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠto	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade.	 ﾠSection	 ﾠ3	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠdefense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠPrinciple.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠformulating	 ﾠand	 ﾠdefending	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠcoherent.	 ﾠ
Section	 ﾠ4	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcoherent,	 ﾠand	 ﾠgives	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠwell	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstatus.	 ﾠSection	 ﾠ5	 ﾠreplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠobjections:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
overdescribed,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠits	 ﾠonly	 ﾠforce	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠ
(such	 ﾠas	 ﾠgun,	 ﾠembryo	 ﾠor	 ﾠanger),	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠcolor	 ﾠand	 ﾠshape.	 ﾠSection	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠconcludes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠThe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“zaplike”	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠperspicuous	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexciting)	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ“a-ﾭ‐rational”,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠinvites	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhallucination	 ﾠis	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠwe’re	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
can’t	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
unfold	 ﾠbeneath	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐person	 ﾠradar.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠheart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
processes	 ﾠas	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠTo	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠapproximation,	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠreliabilism	 ﾠholds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjustificational	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
depends	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠor	 ﾠcausally	 ﾠsustained,	 ﾠand	 ﾠidentifies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠor	 ﾠsustained	 ﾠby	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠMore	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠI	 ﾠset	 ﾠaside	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠany	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠare	 ﾠcheckered.	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠOne	 ﾠcould	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠup	 ﾠa	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustifiedness	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠtracking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
epistemic	 ﾠrole	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠplay	 ﾠin	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠChalmers	 ﾠ(forthcoming)	 ﾠbriefly	 ﾠ
considers	 ﾠa	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘proto-ﾭ‐justification’	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠin	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
purposes	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠproto-ﾭ‐justification	 ﾠis	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
propositional	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuseful.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠone	 ﾠhad	 ﾠuse	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠnotion,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠthen	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
natural	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠproto-ﾭ‐justified	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠas	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ




1.	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠit	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠa	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠpicture,	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠare	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠultimate	 ﾠarbiters	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpicture,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠneither	 ﾠsource	 ﾠis	 ﾠgrounded	 ﾠin	 ﾠreason	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠan	 ﾠultimate	 ﾠarbiter	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠsusceptible	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠevaluation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfoundationalists,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
block	 ﾠregresses	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Let’s	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
epistemic	 ﾠdowngrade.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠ
overemphasizes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠepistemological	 ﾠprofiles	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠand	 ﾠbelief:	 ﾠit	 ﾠsays	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠultimate	 ﾠarbiters	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠcan’t,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠas	 ﾠErnest	 ﾠSosa	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ
“when	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother	 ﾠstate	 ﾠor	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
thereby	 ﾠproblematize	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠrational	 ﾠstanding.	 ﾠBeing	 ﾠso	 ﾠpassive,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
standing.”
	 ﾠ9	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠformed	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
ways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdiminish	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠjustifying	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠJust	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠarise	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
ungrounded	 ﾠsuspicion	 ﾠor	 ﾠexpectation,	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠhope	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠfear,	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ
subsequent	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠformed	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbasis,
	 ﾠ10	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠsuspicion,	 ﾠexpectation,	 ﾠhopes	 ﾠor	 ﾠfears.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠpenetrated	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠ
above	 ﾠarise	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmirror	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠto	 ﾠparadigmatically	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐formed	 ﾠbeliefs:	 ﾠwishful	 ﾠ
thinking,	 ﾠfearful	 ﾠthinking,	 ﾠjumping	 ﾠto	 ﾠconclusions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreaching	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠ
ungrounded	 ﾠassociations	 ﾠor	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠaffect.
11	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠassimilate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠepistemological	 ﾠprofile	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠallows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠplain	 ﾠold	 ﾠhallucinations	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdon’t,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
ways.	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠa	 ﾠplain	 ﾠold	 ﾠhallucination	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠroute	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠyour	 ﾠ
knowing	 ﾠit,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdrug	 ﾠmade	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhallucinate	 ﾠa	 ﾠmustard	 ﾠjar,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠgoes,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhallucination	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠmustard	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠdowngraded	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.
12	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠGod	 ﾠzapped	 ﾠyou	 ﾠinto	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠSosa	 ﾠ(2007),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ46.	 ﾠUltimately	 ﾠSosa	 ﾠdistances	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpicture.	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠSome	 ﾠversions	 ﾠof	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠconservatism	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠunjustified,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠclue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠbased	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠways.	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠthese	 ﾠviews	 ﾠaside	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
They	 ﾠcould	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠline	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefense	 ﾠof	 ﾠphenomenal	 ﾠconservatism	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠcriticisms	 ﾠstemming	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstart.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠcriticisms	 ﾠare	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Siegel	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠand	 ﾠLyons	 ﾠ(forthcoming).	 ﾠFor	 ﾠcriticisms	 ﾠof	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠconservatism,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠChristensen	 ﾠ
(1994).	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠRegarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpliers-ﾭ‐gun	 ﾠexperiment,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠopen	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
disposition	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpriming	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpliers	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠactivates.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoptions,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
Siegel	 ﾠ(ms).	 ﾠA	 ﾠthorny	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠleading	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprime	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠis	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠMany	 ﾠinternalists	 ﾠand	 ﾠexternalists	 ﾠalike	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforce	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠGoldman	 ﾠ
1986	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1998),	 ﾠthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠby	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠ(2008),	 ﾠwho	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ6	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠmustard	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠalso	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠany	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠof	 ﾠmustard,	 ﾠor	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠheld	 ﾠvery	 ﾠstrongly,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
epistemically	 ﾠon	 ﾠpar	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠunsupported	 ﾠhunch.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ If	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠultimate	 ﾠarbiters	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
belief,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠholistic	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
theories	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠignore.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠallow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠdefeat	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠpenetrated	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
having	 ﾠa	 ﾠjustification-ﾭ‐defeater	 ﾠas	 ﾠthese	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtraditionally	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconstrued.
13	 ﾠOpponents	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
immediate	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠjustification,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsupplemented	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠother	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠother	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠ
Thesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠjustification.
14	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ By	 ﾠputting	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠepistemological	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠand	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠto	 ﾠsolve	 ﾠa	 ﾠpuzzle	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
penetration	 ﾠleads	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠalways	 ﾠto	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠcompromise.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
penetration,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthose	 ﾠgenerated	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠfamiliarity	 ﾠor	 ﾠexpertise,	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
epistemologically	 ﾠinnocuous,	 ﾠand	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
baseline.
15	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠof	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠpenetrated	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠ
explains	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthose	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠdowngraded,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
cognitively	 ﾠpenetrated	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠlack	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠ
lead	 ﾠto	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠPrinciple	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠinformal	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwill	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠus.	 ﾠLet’s	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠinformally,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠ
equivalently,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience)	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠresults	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠcompromised	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
informal	 ﾠgloss	 ﾠon	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠall	 ﾠwe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdialectical	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
defense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠprinciple.	 ﾠA	 ﾠproper	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠin	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ4.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Being	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexcludes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠresults	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
expertise	 ﾠand	 ﾠfamiliarity.	 ﾠIntuitively	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠtension	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠor	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠin	 ﾠletting	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
rationally	 ﾠasses	 ﾠprior	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠsuspicions,	 ﾠor	 ﾠfears	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐confirmed,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠcheck	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠthings	 ﾠreally	 ﾠare	 ﾠas	 ﾠbad	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠas	 ﾠgood)	 ﾠas	 ﾠour	 ﾠmood	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthem	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠinformal	 ﾠgloss	 ﾠon	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠopen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexact	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ
based	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem	 ﾠcould	 ﾠend	 ﾠup	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠcompromised,	 ﾠand	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠopen	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠend	 ﾠup	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠcompromised	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠway	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
compared	 ﾠwith	 ﾠintrospectively	 ﾠindiscriminable	 ﾠveridical	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠhallucinations	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠless	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠsee	 ﾠSiegel	 ﾠand	 ﾠSilins	 ﾠ(forthcoming).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠThis	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠabout	 ﾠdefeat	 ﾠis	 ﾠdefended	 ﾠin	 ﾠSiegel	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ4.2.	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠFor	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠmay	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
immediate	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠis	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠin	 ﾠSiegel	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠ
15	 ﾠExamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠby	 ﾠfamiliarity	 ﾠare	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠin	 ﾠSiewert	 ﾠ(1996)	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
expertise	 ﾠin	 ﾠSiegel	 ﾠ(2010),	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ4.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ7	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Principle	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠa	 ﾠstand	 ﾠon	 ﾠboth	 ﾠissues.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠPrinciple,	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
having	 ﾠa	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠpast,	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠdowngraded:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠfalls	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbaseline.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(DP):	 ﾠAn	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠE	 ﾠis	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠdowngraded	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠpast.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠdowngraded	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠcontents,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠits	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠothers.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
matter	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠit	 ﾠwon’t	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
ability	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐ascriptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
localized	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠattaching	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠanger-ﾭ‐example,	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠJill’s	 ﾠanger-ﾭ‐experience	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠanger-ﾭ‐content,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
contents	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠlayout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscene	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠJack	 ﾠwalking	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠroom	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠJill).
16	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Implicit	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrades	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlocalized	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠcan	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠcontents.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠjustification,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
contents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠitself?	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠP	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
justification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠP,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠeither	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠidealization,	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠturns	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperception	 ﾠ
(including	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠexperience)	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdiffers	 ﾠso	 ﾠradically	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperceptions	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcontent.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠshared,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠare	 ﾠcloser	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠthan	 ﾠothers.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
contents	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠand	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠI’ll	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠC	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠC*	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠin	 ﾠdiscussing	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠ
penetrated	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠI’ll	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠC	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠ(or,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠIf	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠhave	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐representational	 ﾠcontents,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ‘there	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠred	 ﾠsquare	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠ
having	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠas	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠred	 ﾠsquare’,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠan	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐
order	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠisolated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠan	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigher-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ
contents.	 ﾠSelf-ﾭ‐representational	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠare	 ﾠdefended	 ﾠby	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠ(1983),	 ﾠ
Chalmers	 ﾠ(2004),	 ﾠKriegel	 ﾠ(2009),	 ﾠSiegel	 ﾠ(2006).	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdowngrade,	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide)	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠclose	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠC*.
17	 ﾠFor	 ﾠconvenience,	 ﾠI	 ﾠoften	 ﾠ
ignore	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcomplication,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠcould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcontents.
18	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠin	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠways,	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
notion	 ﾠof	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠis	 ﾠtied	 ﾠto	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠ
Doxastic	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠjustification,	 ﾠis	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠformed,	 ﾠmaintained	 ﾠor	 ﾠadjusted.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcore	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠthing	 ﾠas	 ﾠforming	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwell	 ﾠor	 ﾠbadly.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠunjustified,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠis	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠdowngraded,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠtied	 ﾠto	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDoxastic	 ﾠ
Downgrade	 ﾠThesis	 ﾠties	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠdowngrades	 ﾠto	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Doxastic	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠS	 ﾠforms	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠB	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠP,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠE	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ




The	 ﾠrestriction	 ﾠto	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠexcludes	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐ascriptions,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“I	 ﾠsee	 ﾠa	 ﾠred	 ﾠ
cube”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“It	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠred	 ﾠcube	 ﾠon	 ﾠmy	 ﾠleft”,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠintuitively	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
epistemic	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠby	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences.	 ﾠ
Paradigms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠunjustified	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠformed	 ﾠby	 ﾠletting	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
ungrounded	 ﾠsuspicion	 ﾠor	 ﾠfear	 ﾠmorph	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDoxastic	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis	 ﾠentails	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠungrounded	 ﾠsuspicion	 ﾠor	 ﾠfear	 ﾠmorphs	 ﾠinto	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠby	 ﾠcheckering	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
way,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠunjustified.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠunjustified	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠcould	 ﾠsimultaneously	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsense:	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠhas	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthese	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠ
figure	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠher	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠformed	 ﾠ–	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠetiology.	 ﾠSometimes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠSome	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief’s	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠC*	 ﾠis	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠC,	 ﾠif	 ﾠC*	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘conceptualization’	 ﾠof	 ﾠC.	 ﾠ(Compare	 ﾠPeacocke	 ﾠ(2004),	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠ3	 ﾠon	 ﾠ‘canonical	 ﾠ
correspondence’	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐conceptual	 ﾠand	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontent).	 ﾠOthers,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠ
(1994),	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠany	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠtransformation.	 ﾠSelf-ﾭ‐ascriptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
close	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐representing.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠBesides	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘conceptualization’	 ﾠas	 ﾠPeacocke	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠit	 ﾠand	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐ascriptions,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
another	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠC	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠjustification,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠyou	 ﾠsee	 ﾠFranco	 ﾠsitting	 ﾠdown,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠyour	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠyou’re	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠFranco	 ﾠor	 ﾠFranco’s	 ﾠ
twin.	 ﾠArguably	 ﾠyour	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
Franco.	 ﾠSeeing	 ﾠFranco	 ﾠsitting	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgive	 ﾠyou	 ﾠexcellent	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFranco	 ﾠis	 ﾠsitting.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠis	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠin	 ﾠSilins	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠ
19	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠqualification	 ﾠis	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠS	 ﾠcould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
p,	 ﾠand	 ﾠher	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠon	 ﾠE.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠB	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
doxastically	 ﾠjustified,	 ﾠthanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠdependence	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠbasis.	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠare	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI’ll	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
usage	 ﾠhere.
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 ﾠ
Whereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDoxastic	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPropositional	 ﾠ
Downgrade	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠ
E	 ﾠis	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbaseline,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠE	 ﾠis	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠdowngraded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠtied	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
propositional	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlink	 ﾠto	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Propositional	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠE	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠP	 ﾠ
provided	 ﾠby	 ﾠE	 ﾠfalls	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbaseline.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Arguably,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠtheses	 ﾠare	 ﾠlinked	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠway:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Linking	 ﾠthesis:	 ﾠIf	 ﾠB	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠP	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠ
doxastically	 ﾠunjustified,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠany	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠP	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
checkered	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwould	 ﾠfall	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbaseline.	 ﾠ
Why	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlinking	 ﾠthesis?	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠ
justified,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠin	 ﾠcase	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠher	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠP.	 ﾠJon	 ﾠKvanvig	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠdefines	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠFeldman	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
concur):	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Doxastic	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠget	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠyou	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ




	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
20	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠusage,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠTurri	 ﾠ(2010),	 ﾠwho	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
believing	 ﾠp	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠforming	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠp	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdefinitions	 ﾠallow	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠcould	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠp,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠformed	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠits	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠcould	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠjustified,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠmental	 ﾠstates	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠis	 ﾠin.	 ﾠI	 ﾠthank	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠChristensen	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠexample.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠI	 ﾠbase	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
mustard-ﾭ‐belief	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠmustard-ﾭ‐experience,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefeater	 ﾠ(I	 ﾠlearned	 ﾠyesterday	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
houseguest	 ﾠhas	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠlots	 ﾠof	 ﾠfake	 ﾠfood	 ﾠitems	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠfridge),	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠintense	 ﾠmustard-ﾭ‐
desire	 ﾠand	 ﾠwishful	 ﾠthinking,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠignore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefeater.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠfar,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠformed	 ﾠbadly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠI	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefeater-ﾭ‐defeater:	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠknow	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhouseguest’s	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠ
convictions	 ﾠentails	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnever	 ﾠplay	 ﾠtricks	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠyellow,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
knowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠviews	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠI	 ﾠignored	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefeater.	 ﾠMy	 ﾠforming	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠmy	 ﾠmustard-ﾭ‐belief	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠetiology,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠisn’t	 ﾠcausally	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠarguably,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefeater-ﾭ‐defeater	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
mustard	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠPJ	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠmustard.	 ﾠ
21	 ﾠKvanvig	 ﾠ(2003).	 ﾠFeldman	 ﾠ(2002)	 ﾠwrites:	 ﾠS’s	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠp	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt	 ﾠis	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠ(well-ﾭ‐founded)	 ﾠiff	 ﾠ
(i)	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠp	 ﾠis	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠfor	 ﾠS	 ﾠat	 ﾠt;	 ﾠ(ii)	 ﾠS	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠp	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsupports	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ10	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Suppose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠfearfully	 ﾠsuspects	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun	 ﾠin	 ﾠher	 ﾠfridge	 ﾠbases	 ﾠher	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐belief	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠher	 ﾠ(checkered)	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐experience,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuppose,	 ﾠas	 ﾠper	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDoxastic	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠthesis,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠunjustified.	 ﾠCan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠnonetheless	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
propositional	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐belief?	 ﾠNot	 ﾠif	 ﾠKvanvig	 ﾠand	 ﾠFeldman	 ﾠare	 ﾠright,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
theories	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠ(DJ)	 ﾠpredict	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠ
justification	 ﾠ(PJ)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐belief	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐belief	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠend	 ﾠup	 ﾠ
doxastically	 ﾠjustified,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbaseline.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠdefense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLinking	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠsketched	 ﾠappeals	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠDJ	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠPJ	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral.	 ﾠA	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠdefense	 ﾠappeals	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠDJ	 ﾠand	 ﾠPJ	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
special	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠdefense,	 ﾠ	 ﾠif	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠ
PJ	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠp	 ﾠ(perhaps	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠfactors),	 ﾠthen	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠjustified.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠrelies	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforming	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠforming	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠ
experiences,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠupstream	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠprovides.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ As	 ﾠthey	 ﾠstand,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠneither	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠis	 ﾠadequate,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠboth	 ﾠignore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
holistic	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠA	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠbit	 ﾠof	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠ
justification,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠstill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠunjustified	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠinsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠhas.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefeat	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠretains	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
justificatory	 ﾠforce	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠdefeated,	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefeater	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠbut	 ﾠbases	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠon	 ﾠit	 ﾠanyway.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠdefeated	 ﾠ
defeaters	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠrelying	 ﾠon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefeat.
22	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠcomplications,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdetract	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠidea	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠboth	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠidea	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠPJ	 ﾠto	 ﾠDJ	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlocalized	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠPJ	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
believing	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠP	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠE	 ﾠisn’t	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠjustified,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠ
(as	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠjustified)	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠE.
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 ﾠ
22	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexample	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfootnotes	 ﾠback,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠillustrates	 ﾠhow	 ﾠDJ	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠholistic	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠPJ	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠpiecemeal.	 ﾠ
23	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlinking	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠfares,	 ﾠif	 ﾠPJ	 ﾠis	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠDJ,	 ﾠas	 ﾠJohn	 ﾠTurri	 ﾠ
proposes	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠpaper:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Necessarily,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠS,	 ﾠp,	 ﾠand	 ﾠt,	 ﾠif	 ﾠp	 ﾠis	 ﾠpropositionally	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠfor	 ﾠS	 ﾠat	 ﾠt,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠp	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
propositionally	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠfor	 ﾠS	 ﾠat	 ﾠt	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠS	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
coming	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠp	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwere	 ﾠS	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠp	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠways,	 ﾠS’s	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
thereby	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠjustified.	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠX)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Even	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefinitional	 ﾠpriority	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdirection,	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
doxastically	 ﾠunjustified	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠhave	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠforce.	 ﾠTurri	 ﾠis	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
identify	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠunder	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠa	 ﾠtime)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠany	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠp	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
all,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠunder	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠreason	 ﾠor	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠmental	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠas	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠcounts	 ﾠas	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
subjects	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpliers-ﾭ‐gun	 ﾠexample	 ﾠplausible	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ“currently	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠmeans”	 ﾠ11	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlinking	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠweight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDP	 ﾠrests	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDoxastic	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠ
thesis.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠPrinciple	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠone,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
upshots	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ1	 ﾠremain.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠbesides,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠleft	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠPJ	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠallows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠPJ	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠP,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠprevented	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠis	 ﾠwatered	 ﾠdown	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠextreme.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDoxastic	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Clearly	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠto	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠchains	 ﾠlinking	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠpast	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠWhat’s	 ﾠless	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠconduit	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠbadly	 ﾠformed,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindirect	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
checkering.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDoxastic	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis	 ﾠin	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠsays	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠconduits.	 ﾠAre	 ﾠthey?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Perhaps	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠif	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbased	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcheckering	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠelements	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠit).	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠabout	 ﾠbasing	 ﾠ
seems	 ﾠfalse,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadjusting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdispose	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠis	 ﾠtied	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠan	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinforms	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠ
attempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠpin	 ﾠdown	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelusive	 ﾠbasing	 ﾠrelation.
24	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠadjusting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcheckering	 ﾠelements	 ﾠ–	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠlosing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfear	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
gun	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐experience,	 ﾠor	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠup	 ﾠon	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠbacking	 ﾠoff	 ﾠfrom)	 ﾠ
preformationism	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlead	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠshe	 ﾠalready	 ﾠformed	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠyou	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun	 ﾠin	 ﾠyour	 ﾠfridge	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
your	 ﾠfearful-ﾭ‐suspicion-ﾭ‐checkered	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwere	 ﾠunaware	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyour	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐fear	 ﾠhad	 ﾠ
checkered	 ﾠyour	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthen	 ﾠlost	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfear,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwouldn’t	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpsychologically	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
you	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠyour	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠyou’d	 ﾠput	 ﾠthings	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠyour	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠview,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ‘saw’	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfridge.
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of	 ﾠforming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐belief,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠwill	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠ
experience,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠby	 ﾠhypothesis,	 ﾠbasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐belief	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠmade	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠunjustified.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Turri	 ﾠwants	 ﾠto	 ﾠemphasize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠusing	 ﾠyour	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠwell	 ﾠin	 ﾠbelief-ﾭ‐formation	 ﾠ
(and	 ﾠadjustment),	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠin	 ﾠpossessing	 ﾠit.	 ﾠHis	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠisn’t	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠevidence;	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠutilize	 ﾠthem	 ﾠproperly	 ﾠin	 ﾠreaching	 ﾠyour	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmove	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
vindicate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠafter	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠcheckered,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠstill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠutilized	 ﾠ
properly.	 ﾠ
24	 ﾠSee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠand	 ﾠcounterfactual	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠof	 ﾠbasing	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠKorcz	 ﾠ(1997)	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ(2010).	 ﾠ
25	 ﾠLike	 ﾠall	 ﾠglosses	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasing	 ﾠrelation,	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠarise	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠone	 ﾠif	 ﾠadjustability	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠa	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbasing	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠadjusting	 ﾠX	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠyou	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠB,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠX	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠB).	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠgetting	 ﾠnew	 ﾠhigher-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠabout	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠor	 ﾠits	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠ(such	 ﾠas	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠexperts	 ﾠdisagree,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠreasoned	 ﾠto	 ﾠB	 ﾠimproperly)	 ﾠmight	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠrational	 ﾠfor	 ﾠyou	 ﾠto	 ﾠ12	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Fortunately,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠassess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDoxastic	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠsettling	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠis	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcheckering	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠask	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠdowngraded	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
checkered,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe’re	 ﾠasking	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠcan	 ﾠserve	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcarrier	 ﾠfor	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠon	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ(by	 ﾠfear,	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠsuspicions,	 ﾠmood	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠfactors)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
obviously	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠbad.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠby	 ﾠcomparing	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠmental	 ﾠstate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠknow	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠbeliefs:	 ﾠ
doxastically	 ﾠunjustified	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠI’ll	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠcall	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ“ill-ﾭ‐founded”.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠmore	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠyou	 ﾠbase	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠB2	 ﾠon	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠB1),	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
share?	 ﾠIf	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠ
beliefs,	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠetiology.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠif	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠother	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠexclusively	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠshare	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠsome	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠhave	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmirror	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐
founded	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠformed	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthus	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDoxastic	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis:	 ﾠ
consider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠshared	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsee	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
features	 ﾠplay	 ﾠany	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠtransmit	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐foundedness	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠformed	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbasis.	 ﾠI	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
beliefs,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠplay	 ﾠany	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
ill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠother	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠgives	 ﾠus	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
features	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠshared	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
experiences.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠthose	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠare	 ﾠshared	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthat’s	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠif	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠother	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠetiology,	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠpast.	 ﾠ
How	 ﾠdo	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠexperiences?	 ﾠA	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
irrational,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠDoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠ
play	 ﾠany	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠother	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs?	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
sharpen	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠB1	 ﾠgenerates	 ﾠan	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠB2,	 ﾠand	 ﾠB1	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠso	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
virtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠetiology,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠonly	 ﾠever	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠB1	 ﾠitself	 ﾠis	 ﾠirrational?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠNo.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠsee	 ﾠwhy,	 ﾠlet’s	 ﾠlook	 ﾠmore	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded.	 ﾠSometimes,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠB1	 ﾠis	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠand	 ﾠB2	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠB1,	 ﾠB2	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
thereby	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.
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 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhappens,	 ﾠB1	 ﾠtransmits	 ﾠits	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐foundedness	 ﾠto	 ﾠB2.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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adjust	 ﾠB,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠintuitively	 ﾠshouldn’t	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcounted	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠB’s	 ﾠbasis.	 ﾠThanks	 ﾠfor	 ﾠJim	 ﾠPryor	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
discussion.	 ﾠ
26	 ﾠThis	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠallows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠmight	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠtransmit	 ﾠits	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐foundedness,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
surrounding	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠjustified.	 ﾠ(For	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠFeldman	 ﾠand	 ﾠConee	 ﾠ(2001).	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
instance,	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠan	 ﾠinattentive	 ﾠclassmate	 ﾠtells	 ﾠyou	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠPlymouth	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠcapitol	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Massachusetts,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠyou	 ﾠforget	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthat’s	 ﾠhow	 ﾠyou	 ﾠcame	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠMeanwhile	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
false	 ﾠbut	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠhigher-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠlearned	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠcapitols	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠproper	 ﾠschooling.	 ﾠ
According	 ﾠto	 ﾠFeldman	 ﾠand	 ﾠConee,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPlymouth-ﾭ‐belief	 ﾠis	 ﾠjustified,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ13	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠis	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontagion.	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠJill	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcold,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠgives	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠJack,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
now	 ﾠJack	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcold	 ﾠtoo.	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠB1	 ﾠis	 ﾠirrational,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠB2	 ﾠis	 ﾠformed	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠB1,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow	 ﾠB2	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠtoo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠsome	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠtransmit	 ﾠirrationality,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠirrational.	 ﾠOften	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠclusters	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠon	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠevery	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasing	 ﾠcluster	 ﾠneed	 ﾠbe	 ﾠirrational,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠto	 ﾠend	 ﾠup	 ﾠthat	 ﾠway.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠNew	 ﾠJersey	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠand	 ﾠirrationally	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠNew	 ﾠ
Jersey	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠraining	 ﾠlocusts,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠend	 ﾠup	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI’ll	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠsee	 ﾠsome	 ﾠlocusts	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠI	 ﾠget	 ﾠthere,	 ﾠthanks	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠrational	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠgoing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
So	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠirrational,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠformed	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠbasis.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠnever	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpreclude	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠmental	 ﾠstates	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠabsent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
etiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠspiders	 ﾠmake	 ﾠme	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠfrightened,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠform	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠ(upon	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠone)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠThere’s	 ﾠa	 ﾠspider,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠfear	 ﾠcan	 ﾠserve	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠconduit	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠan	 ﾠindispensable	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠendangering	 ﾠme.	 ﾠ
Likewise,	 ﾠif	 ﾠyour	 ﾠdog	 ﾠMack	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠme	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠlucky,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠI	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠis	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
lucky	 ﾠday	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠThere’s	 ﾠMack.	 ﾠI	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspider	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠharm	 ﾠme,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMack	 ﾠbrings	 ﾠme	 ﾠluck	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe’s	 ﾠnearby,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠfear	 ﾠor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠsuperstition	 ﾠ(about	 ﾠMack)	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠ
based	 ﾠon	 ﾠperfectly	 ﾠrational	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠspiders	 ﾠor	 ﾠMack.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthese	 ﾠexamples,	 ﾠ
my	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠlocusts	 ﾠor	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠlucky	 ﾠor	 ﾠendangered	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
beliefs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠhallmarks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasing	 ﾠrelation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ So	 ﾠfar,	 ﾠI’ve	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperiences:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠor	 ﾠirrational,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠI’ve	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠirrational,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠother	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠformed	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
generally,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠany	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠmental	 ﾠstate	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
etiology.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠmake	 ﾠother	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
features	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠlack.	 ﾠHow	 ﾠelse	 ﾠdo	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠexperiences?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠformed	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠ
reasoning.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠreason	 ﾠour	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠimpacted	 ﾠby	 ﾠits	 ﾠetiology.	 ﾠUsually	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠ
explicitly	 ﾠreason	 ﾠour	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠformed	 ﾠcan	 ﾠstill	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠstatus.	 ﾠMany	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠformed	 ﾠby	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunfold	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmental	 ﾠbasement,	 ﾠ
putting	 ﾠthem	 ﾠon	 ﾠpar	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠautomaticity.	 ﾠMost	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
like	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠare	 ﾠmany	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠother	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwant	 ﾠor	 ﾠintend	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠand	 ﾠtestimonial	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠour	 ﾠeyes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠexceptional	 ﾠcases	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠreason	 ﾠour	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠis	 ﾠlike,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠit	 ﾠlooks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠformed	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠforward-ﾭ‐looking	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠby	 ﾠits	 ﾠetiology.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠthird	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠadjusted	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠevidence,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠnorm.	 ﾠHere	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠa	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcould	 ﾠagree	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsometimes,	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founding	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠunjustified,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠformed	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠbe	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ14	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
psychological	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠputative	 ﾠdisanalogy	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
normative	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisanalogy	 ﾠis:	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnorm	 ﾠof	 ﾠadjusting	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠto	 ﾠevidence.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠnorm	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdisanalogy	 ﾠis:	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠadjustable	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠevidence.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠcontroversial	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
any,	 ﾠone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnonetheless	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠthought	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠover	 ﾠexperiences.
27	 ﾠ
Along	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠdimension,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisanalogy	 ﾠis	 ﾠfaint.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠsome	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
output	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠreasoning,	 ﾠmost	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
norm	 ﾠwhereby	 ﾠone	 ﾠshould	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠevidence,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠ
norms	 ﾠspecifying	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠexperiences.
28	 ﾠPart	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
adjusting	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠis	 ﾠadjusting	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠrely	 ﾠ
on,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ(non-ﾭ‐suppositional)	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcease	 ﾠto	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
reasoning	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcease	 ﾠto	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠ
believed,	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠwe	 ﾠadjusted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠevidence.
29	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠdisanalogy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvicinity	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠdimension,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠadjustable	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠevidence,	 ﾠor	 ﾠformed	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
result	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠreasoning.	 ﾠBeliefs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠso	 ﾠadjusted	 ﾠor	 ﾠformed,	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠcannot.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
immediately	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠhow	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠadjustability	 ﾠwould	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠtransmit	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
ill-ﾭ‐foundedness.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠseems	 ﾠworth	 ﾠexploring,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠadjustability	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠdisanalogy	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperiences.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Although	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠadjusted	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠevidence,	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠ
factors	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐deception	 ﾠor	 ﾠinadequate	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠmay	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthem	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠadjust.	 ﾠA	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠis	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠevidence,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠdoesn’t	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould:	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠblatant	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠE	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠchild’s	 ﾠmuddy	 ﾠhandprints	 ﾠare	 ﾠall	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠwall,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthere	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠyou	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠnot-ﾭ‐very-ﾭ‐complicated	 ﾠmathematical	 ﾠproof),	 ﾠyou	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠconclusion,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠafter	 ﾠreflecting,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
well-ﾭ‐supported	 ﾠby	 ﾠE.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmuddy	 ﾠhandprint	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparent	 ﾠignores	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
child’s	 ﾠmisbehavior,	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchild	 ﾠis	 ﾠinnocent;	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmath	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproof.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠto	 ﾠfit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas.	 ﾠA	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠexample	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ
27	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠSosa	 ﾠ(2007),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ46:	 ﾠ“Experiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠfoundational	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠthey	 ﾠlie	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠand	 ﾠunjustification.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠpassively	 ﾠreceived,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
cannot	 ﾠmanifest	 ﾠobedience	 ﾠto	 ﾠanything,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠrational	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
otherwise.”	 ﾠ
28	 ﾠPerhaps	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠspecifying	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
pain	 ﾠof	 ﾠirrationality.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠif	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisbelieve	 ﾠor	 ﾠrefrain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠendorsing	 ﾠ
your	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠanyway	 ﾠis	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠunreasonable.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠJackson	 ﾠ
(forthcoming).	 ﾠ
29	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠto	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐suppositional	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠaction	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠit,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠis	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠfalse.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠis	 ﾠgranted,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
entail	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠrely	 ﾠ
on.	 ﾠ15	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlead	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠto	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠignore	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠ
experience.
30	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐deception	 ﾠand	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠbias,	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠfact	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
adjust	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠor	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠand	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠcouldn’t	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠgood	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠupheaval.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmiss	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠto	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠunadjustable	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠevidence,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠafter	 ﾠall.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠlimitations	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠany	 ﾠprincipled	 ﾠor	 ﾠsystematic	 ﾠ
unadjustability	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠweren’t	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐deceived,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwere	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠat	 ﾠmathematical	 ﾠ
reasoning,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcould	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠevidence.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠdisanalogous	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperiences.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Does	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdisanalogy	 ﾠlie	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠof	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠone	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
another?	 ﾠIt	 ﾠseems	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠcan	 ﾠremain	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠadjustable	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠthem	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtransmitting	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐
foundedness.	 ﾠA	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠin	 ﾠadjusting	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠ
impact	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐foundedness	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtransmitted.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadjustability	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠto	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠtransmit	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐foundedness	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
subsequent	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠformed	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbasis.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠlast	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠand	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠdispositional,	 ﾠ
whereas	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdispositional	 ﾠform.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠfeature,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
seem	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠenabling	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠto	 ﾠtransmit	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐foundedness.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠtransmit	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐foundedness.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Our	 ﾠexamination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisanalogies	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
ill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠtransmit	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐foundedness,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠshared	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
experiences,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠto	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠ




4.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience?	 ﾠ
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30	 ﾠA	 ﾠfanciful	 ﾠexample	 ﾠis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠPlantinga	 ﾠ(1993)	 ﾠwho	 ﾠimagines	 ﾠa	 ﾠclimber	 ﾠwho	 ﾠgets	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠ
frozen:	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠrock-ﾭ‐climbing,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠfrozen,	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠmountain	 ﾠhanging	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠrocks	 ﾠwith	 ﾠbirds	 ﾠcircling	 ﾠ
overhead,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠhim	 ﾠunfreeze)	 ﾠhis	 ﾠfriends	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
opera.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠPlantinga	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclimber	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠvisual	 ﾠand	 ﾠauditory	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠhave	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠgo	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopera,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthese	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠmake	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
impact	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ(he	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeven	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐ascribe	 ﾠthem),	 ﾠand	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠrock-ﾭ‐climbing.	 ﾠDepending	 ﾠon	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠone	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoherence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexample.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠscale,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
subjects	 ﾠto	 ﾠignore	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠformation	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠignore	 ﾠother	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
evidence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠinattentive	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcontents,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠrealistic	 ﾠexample.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
Siegel	 ﾠand	 ﾠSilins	 ﾠ(forthcoming-ﾭ‐b).	 ﾠ	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So	 ﾠfar,	 ﾠI’ve	 ﾠrelied	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠinformal	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtime	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
characterize	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcarefully.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
First,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠto	 ﾠfix	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠspeaking,	 ﾠlet	 ﾠus	 ﾠstipulate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠ
states	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠits	 ﾠoutput:	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠor	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
ask	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠan	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠis	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠor	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠasking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠ
status	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠstate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠits	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠantecedents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠcould	 ﾠit	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠetiology,	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational?	 ﾠLet	 ﾠme	 ﾠsay	 ﾠright	 ﾠoff	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠ
assessable	 ﾠand	 ﾠarational	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠwon’t	 ﾠand	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠcan’t	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠsharply,	 ﾠand	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠgrey	 ﾠ
areas	 ﾠwill	 ﾠremain.
31	 ﾠBut	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠparadigms	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠarational	 ﾠetiologies,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠany.	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠare	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠ
cognitive	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠA	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠmight	 ﾠseem	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠentities,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgod	 ﾠor	 ﾠdemon,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠregularly	 ﾠcause	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoccasion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠmental	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoccasion	 ﾠof	 ﾠracist	 ﾠfears	 ﾠor	 ﾠbouts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
overconfidence,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdemon	 ﾠmight	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐experiences	 ﾠor	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠapproving	 ﾠ
expressions	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠsea	 ﾠof	 ﾠfaces.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcandidates	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠ
ones	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠat	 ﾠissue	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ My	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠfor	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠand	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐
rational	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠin	 ﾠstages,	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
belief,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠfor	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Etiologies	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠas	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlead	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠplace.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbroaden	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠto	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthree	 ﾠother	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
processes:	 ﾠ	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthey	 ﾠalready	 ﾠhave	 ﾠby	 ﾠbecoming	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠless	 ﾠconfident	 ﾠin	 ﾠthem;	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠ
considering	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ(this	 ﾠcould	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠignoring	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat’s	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠor	 ﾠignoring	 ﾠ
factors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠirrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief),	 ﾠand	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐affirm	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠuninformative	 ﾠdouble-ﾭ‐checking:	 ﾠyou’re	 ﾠpretty	 ﾠsure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠyour	 ﾠkeys,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpatting	 ﾠyour	 ﾠpocket	 ﾠto	 ﾠdouble-ﾭ‐check	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠyou	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠas	 ﾠconfident	 ﾠas	 ﾠyou	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwith:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbump	 ﾠyou	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠisn’t	 ﾠstrange	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠyou	 ﾠany	 ﾠless	 ﾠsure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠyour	 ﾠkeys,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠisn’t	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠbump	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠyou	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠeither).
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 ﾠPart	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcomplicates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlive	 ﾠoption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠtransitions	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
propositionally	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠstates	 ﾠare	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠ(think	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschizophrenics	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠis	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchess	 ﾠboard	 ﾠis	 ﾠarranged	 ﾠthus-ﾭ‐
and-ﾭ‐so),	 ﾠand	 ﾠsome	 ﾠassociations	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐propositionally	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠelements	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
rationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠ(associating	 ﾠdanger	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmice	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠirrational,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelements	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsettle	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠhas.	 ﾠ
32	 ﾠThis	 ﾠexpanded	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
notion	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠto	 ﾠpreserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠ17	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠand	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠ
etiologies	 ﾠrelies	 ﾠon	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠassumptions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠformed	 ﾠbeneath	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐person	 ﾠ
radar,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠarise	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsubpersonally	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠheuristics,	 ﾠbiases,	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
inference-ﾭ‐like	 ﾠprocesses,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠdown	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠus	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠassessing	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠrational	 ﾠor	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠforming	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ
Inductions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠwell	 ﾠor	 ﾠbadly,	 ﾠusing	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠor	 ﾠinappropriate	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠas	 ﾠbases	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
projection.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠheuristics	 ﾠand	 ﾠbiases	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠones	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse.	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmyriad	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠget	 ﾠformed,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠprevented	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠasking	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthese	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠare	 ﾠrational,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠserve	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
juries,	 ﾠor	 ﾠplan	 ﾠa	 ﾠvacation,	 ﾠor	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠphilosophy.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠhave	 ﾠisn’t	 ﾠ
known,	 ﾠand	 ﾠoften	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcontroversial	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave.
33	 ﾠA	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
example	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠmade	 ﾠknown	 ﾠby	 ﾠTversky	 ﾠand	 ﾠKahneman	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠmake	 ﾠquite	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠ
mistakes	 ﾠin	 ﾠprobabilistic	 ﾠreasoning,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠis	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐
known	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠLinda,	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠjust	 ﾠtold	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠactive	 ﾠ
philosophy	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠin	 ﾠcollege,	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠfeminist	 ﾠbank	 ﾠteller	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠbank	 ﾠteller.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
controversial	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠuse	 ﾠto	 ﾠarrive	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠa	 ﾠheuristic	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsome	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠ
across	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ(such	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
conversation	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠleading	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion)	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠan	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐
rational	 ﾠroute	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠon	 ﾠpar	 ﾠwith	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠzapped	 ﾠby	 ﾠGod.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠforming	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠadjusting	 ﾠor	 ﾠmaintaining)	 ﾠ
beliefs,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠregard	 ﾠeither	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠor	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠsubpersonal	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠas	 ﾠconvicted	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠerror	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠended	 ﾠup	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠvia	 ﾠthat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠwould	 ﾠwe	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
processes	 ﾠas	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠrational.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠraised	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠlemons	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
depictions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠ(using	 ﾠyour	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠimpoverished	 ﾠlemon-ﾭ‐concept)	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠsome	 ﾠlemons	 ﾠripen	 ﾠred.	 ﾠYou	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠfaulty	 ﾠinduction,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠGod,	 ﾠor	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠflu,	 ﾠor	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠan	 ﾠimbalance	 ﾠof	 ﾠneurotransmitters	 ﾠsomehow	 ﾠ
directly	 ﾠzapped	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠinto	 ﾠyou,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠinstigating	 ﾠany	 ﾠintervening	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
induction,	 ﾠno	 ﾠreliance	 ﾠon	 ﾠheuristics	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠsort,	 ﾠno	 ﾠhearing	 ﾠany	 ﾠdivine	 ﾠvoice,	 ﾠno	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
status.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠformed,	 ﾠand	 ﾠaren’t	 ﾠor	 ﾠmaybe	 ﾠeven	 ﾠcan’t	 ﾠbe	 ﾠadjusted	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠall,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠinfrastructure.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠmight	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐
person	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠexist,	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠworld	 ﾠexists,	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠphysics	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠcomponents	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘core	 ﾠcognition’,	 ﾠor	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowledge)	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
you’re	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠyou’re	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠit.	 ﾠDespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
still	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpanded	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠis	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠ
good	 ﾠetiology,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠcould	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠcount	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠjustified.	 ﾠ
(On	 ﾠcore	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠinfrastructure,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠCarey	 ﾠ(2009).	 ﾠOn	 ﾠ
knowing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠyou’re	 ﾠdoing,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠSetiya	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠ
33	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠGigerenzer	 ﾠ(2001).	 ﾠ18	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠany	 ﾠother	 ﾠstates	 ﾠor	 ﾠproperties.
34	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠregard	 ﾠyou	 ﾠor	 ﾠyour	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
having	 ﾠmade	 ﾠany	 ﾠerror	 ﾠin	 ﾠarriving	 ﾠat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠzaps	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbrute	 ﾠincursions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
divine	 ﾠor	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠphysiological	 ﾠdomain.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠcalling	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠintuitive,	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠlaying	 ﾠit	 ﾠdown	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessed,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthey	 ﾠresult	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠno	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠoff	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrid	 ﾠof	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠare.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠrooted	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
cases	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠcausation	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠby	 ﾠGod	 ﾠor	 ﾠlightning	 ﾠbolts.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠidea	 ﾠis	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprimitive,	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠanalyzable	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
anything	 ﾠelse.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠby	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠhave	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠ
assessable	 ﾠetiologies.	 ﾠBeliefs	 ﾠnever	 ﾠfall	 ﾠoff	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrid	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠ(there	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthing	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠbelief),	 ﾠyet	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠand	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ For	 ﾠus	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠand	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠ
assessable	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoherence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
distinction,	 ﾠextreme	 ﾠand	 ﾠfictional	 ﾠcases	 ﾠare	 ﾠall	 ﾠthat’s	 ﾠneeded.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠare	 ﾠthere	 ﾠany	 ﾠactual	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠbeliefs?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay.
35	 ﾠCandidates	 ﾠmay	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠbrainwashing	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠhypnosis,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthose	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠwork.	 ﾠPerhaps	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdelusions	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠ
schizophrenia	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstatus,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprima-ﾭ‐facie	 ﾠincoherent	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpatients	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
express	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠthoughts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠelse	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
projected	 ﾠinto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmind	 ﾠlike	 ﾠa	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠflashed	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠscreen.	 ﾠOr	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
schizophrenic	 ﾠpatient	 ﾠonce	 ﾠreported	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠlizards	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠchest,	 ﾠcausing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
skin	 ﾠon	 ﾠhis	 ﾠarm	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠscaly.
36	 ﾠYou	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdelusional	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
34	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠcomplication:	 ﾠif	 ﾠeven	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠzap,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhad	 ﾠno	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcolor	 ﾠ
lemons	 ﾠripen	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwould	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefeater	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠzapped	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠif	 ﾠyou	 ﾠ
persisted	 ﾠin	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlemons	 ﾠripen	 ﾠred,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlemon-ﾭ‐belief	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠirrational,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠof	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠetiology,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwere	 ﾠignoring	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefeater.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠeliminate	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠconfounding	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠirrationality	 ﾠby	 ﾠadding	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthought-ﾭ‐experiment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠGod’s	 ﾠzap	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠyou	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠ(de	 ﾠdicto)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcolor	 ﾠlemons	 ﾠripen	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠ
35	 ﾠMandelbaum,	 ﾠ“Thinking	 ﾠis	 ﾠBelieving”	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠpreparation)	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
formed	 ﾠand	 ﾠmaintained	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rationally,	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠon	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠperseverance	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠ(Wegner	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ
1985)	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnchoring	 ﾠheuristic	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠby	 ﾠTversky	 ﾠand	 ﾠKahneman.	 ﾠSubjects	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
asked	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠnumerical	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠ(about	 ﾠhow	 ﾠold	 ﾠGandhi	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdied,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample)	 ﾠ
incorporate	 ﾠnumerical	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠknow	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠirrelevant	 ﾠ(such	 ﾠas	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠ
number)	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠirrelevant	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠis	 ﾠsalient.	 ﾠMandelbaum	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠanything	 ﾠthat	 ﾠremotely	 ﾠresembles	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
paradigm	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠeven	 ﾠbad	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠin	 ﾠreconstructing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
participants	 ﾠarrive	 ﾠat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠanswers.	 ﾠ
36	 ﾠBrowning	 ﾠand	 ﾠJones	 ﾠ(1988).	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthought-ﾭ‐insertion,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠFrith	 ﾠand	 ﾠFrith	 ﾠ(2003).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmetaphor	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
projection	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠscreen	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠpatient	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠby	 ﾠMellor	 ﾠ(1970):	 ﾠI	 ﾠlook	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwindow	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgarden	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠnice	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrass	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠcool,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthoughts	 ﾠof	 ﾠEamonn	 ﾠ19	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
etiologies	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ(crazy)	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperiences:	 ﾠvisibly	 ﾠscaly	 ﾠskin,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ(perhaps)	 ﾠ
weird	 ﾠphenomenology	 ﾠof	 ﾠthought.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlizard-ﾭ‐delusion	 ﾠcould	 ﾠcome	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
confirmation	 ﾠbias	 ﾠleads	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠto	 ﾠelaborate	 ﾠthem	 ﾠby	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠscaly	 ﾠskin	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠsign	 ﾠof	 ﾠlizards	 ﾠ
within.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠarational	 ﾠetiology.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Etiologies	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠin	 ﾠhand	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠand	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
belief,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠan	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠX	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠE	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠC	 ﾠis	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠiff	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
etiology	 ﾠX*	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠB	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠC	 ﾠis	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠX*	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠ
psychological	 ﾠelements	 ﾠas	 ﾠX,	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠit	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠintervening	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Consider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstarted	 ﾠwith.	 ﾠJust	 ﾠas	 ﾠfearing	 ﾠor	 ﾠsuspecting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠJack	 ﾠis	 ﾠangry	 ﾠcould	 ﾠmorph	 ﾠinto	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthese	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠso	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠcould	 ﾠfears	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
suspicions	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠboth	 ﾠtogether)	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐experience	 ﾠupon	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge,	 ﾠor	 ﾠan	 ﾠanger-ﾭ‐
experience	 ﾠupon	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠJack.	 ﾠ	 ﾠJust	 ﾠas	 ﾠwanting	 ﾠpreformationism	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠcould	 ﾠmorph	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠso	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠcould	 ﾠwanting	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠan	 ﾠembryo-ﾭ‐experience	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
someone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmicroscope.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠelements	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠare	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠof	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthem	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠ
assessable.	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠabout	 ﾠcases	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠit	 ﾠgives	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto?	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠJill	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠJack	 ﾠis	 ﾠangry,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠcheckers	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
anger-ﾭ‐experience,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠsees	 ﾠJack	 ﾠshe	 ﾠforms	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠangry.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthink	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠperseverance.	 ﾠJill	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠlater	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠit	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠand	 ﾠkept	 ﾠit.	 ﾠConsidered	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
perseverance	 ﾠis	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable:	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠconservatives	 ﾠsay	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐
founded,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠopponents	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan’t.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDoxastic	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠThesis,	 ﾠcombined	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
rejecting	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠconservatism,	 ﾠpredicts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠJill’s	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠis	 ﾠdowngraded.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Once	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmove	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfictional	 ﾠexamples,	 ﾠone	 ﾠmight	 ﾠobject	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnever	 ﾠbe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠintervening	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠ
You	 ﾠwouldn’t	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠsausage	 ﾠmachine	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠM&M	 ﾠcandy	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
mechanism.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠas	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠas	 ﾠsausages	 ﾠand	 ﾠM&M’s,	 ﾠone	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
think,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠjust	 ﾠcouldn’t	 ﾠhave	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠetiologies.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠreply,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠboth	 ﾠa	 ﾠpriori	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperimental	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
penetration	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠactually	 ﾠoccurs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠvia	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠboth	 ﾠparadigmatically	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠparadigmatically	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐
founded	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠI	 ﾠwon’t	 ﾠrepeat	 ﾠa	 ﾠpriori	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠelsewhere	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
properties	 ﾠbesides,	 ﾠshape,	 ﾠillumination,	 ﾠmotion	 ﾠare	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠvisual	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠreason	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠif	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠor	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠtree	 ﾠor	 ﾠpine	 ﾠtree	 ﾠare	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠvisual	 ﾠ
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Andrews	 ﾠcome	 ﾠinto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠmind.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠno	 ﾠother	 ﾠthoughts	 ﾠthere,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠhis.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠtreats	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
mind	 ﾠlike	 ﾠa	 ﾠscreen	 ﾠand	 ﾠflashes	 ﾠthoughts	 ﾠonto	 ﾠit	 ﾠlike	 ﾠyou	 ﾠflash	 ﾠa	 ﾠpicture.”	 ﾠ20	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
experience,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
properties,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠextent	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable.
37	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠif	 ﾠyou	 ﾠ
formed	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠX	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠpine	 ﾠtree	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠtold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠX	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
structure,	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠwith	 ﾠyour	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠpine	 ﾠtrees	 ﾠhave,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠforming	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠas	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠ
assessable	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠinput	 ﾠcombines	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprior	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠpine	 ﾠtrees	 ﾠlook	 ﾠlike	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠpine-ﾭ‐tree	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠof	 ﾠpine-ﾭ‐tree	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand	 ﾠand	 ﾠpine-ﾭ‐tree	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠstructured,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠelements.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Besides	 ﾠa	 ﾠpriori	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠabout	 ﾠrecognitional	 ﾠdispositions,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠexperiments	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠprior	 ﾠexpectations,	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠor	 ﾠstereotypes	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠintervening	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠA	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠexperimental	 ﾠ
results	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠby	 ﾠsubpersonal	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
operate	 ﾠlike	 ﾠpredictions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwill	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐
experiential	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠinput	 ﾠfits	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠpattern	 ﾠof	 ﾠpast	 ﾠinputs.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠtheories,	 ﾠscene-ﾭ‐
perception	 ﾠprecedes	 ﾠobject-ﾭ‐perception,	 ﾠenabling	 ﾠsubpersonal	 ﾠscene-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠpredictions	 ﾠ(such	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠbathrooms	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠsinks,	 ﾠstreets	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠtrees,	 ﾠkitchens	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠfridges)	 ﾠto	 ﾠplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠ
role	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐level,	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐conscious	 ﾠstates	 ﾠof	 ﾠvisual	 ﾠprocessing,	 ﾠto	 ﾠcategorization	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠobjects.
38	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcolor	 ﾠperception,	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbananas	 ﾠare	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠperhaps,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠweakly,	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgreatly	 ﾠresemble	 ﾠbananas	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠform)	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcolor	 ﾠyou	 ﾠsee	 ﾠachromatic	 ﾠ
bananas	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠachromatic	 ﾠbanana-ﾭ‐ish	 ﾠthings)	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠvisual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbanana	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprediction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠyellow.
39	 ﾠIn	 ﾠlightness	 ﾠperception,	 ﾠ
racially	 ﾠambiguous	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠlook	 ﾠlighter	 ﾠor	 ﾠdarker	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠracially	 ﾠclassified.
40	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ By	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠexperiments	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtell	 ﾠus	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠunderlie	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
effects	 ﾠon	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠsome	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠmechanisms.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠ
good	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠreasonably	 ﾠask	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
processes	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠand	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠalso	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠare	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlead	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠmemory	 ﾠcolor,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠones,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ(hypothetical)	 ﾠanger	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Someone	 ﾠmight	 ﾠobject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠwouldn’t	 ﾠcount	 ﾠas	 ﾠperception	 ﾠat	 ﾠall,	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠdidn’t	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠinputs.
41	 ﾠIn	 ﾠearly	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠFodor	 ﾠ(1975)	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“some	 ﾠmental	 ﾠstates	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
result	 ﾠof	 ﾠbrute	 ﾠincursions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphysiological	 ﾠlevel,”	 ﾠand	 ﾠwent	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠexample	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠ
causal	 ﾠdetermination	 ﾠof	 ﾠsensation”	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠperception,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠresulted	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠcomputations	 ﾠon	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠmaterial.	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠone	 ﾠaccepts	 ﾠFodor’s	 ﾠlater	 ﾠ
architectural	 ﾠproposal,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠroles	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠtransducers,	 ﾠinput	 ﾠanalyzers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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41	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperception	 ﾠis	 ﾠpassive	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠactive.	 ﾠ21	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠprocessing,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠindispensable	 ﾠplace	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠtransducers	 ﾠon	 ﾠany	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠprocessing.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwere	 ﾠexhausted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠ
causal	 ﾠrelation,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠits	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠwon’t	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠbrute	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠincursions	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠtransducers	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠcome	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠexhausting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠ
experience.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠstart,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠconstancies	 ﾠof	 ﾠsize,	 ﾠshape	 ﾠor	 ﾠcolor.	 ﾠ
Phenomenologically,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstraightforward	 ﾠinput	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
environment.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphenomenology	 ﾠof	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠguide	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
experience.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠnow	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcarefully.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Checkered	 ﾠExperiences:	 ﾠAn	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠE	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠC	 ﾠand	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠX	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠ
past	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠequivalenty,	 ﾠis	 ﾠcheckered)	 ﾠiff:	 ﾠ
⋅  X	 ﾠis	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠassessable,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
⋅  a	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠC	 ﾠand	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠX*	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠunjustified,	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠof	 ﾠX*	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwith	 ﾠno	 ﾠintervening	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠand	 ﾠX*	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠelements	 ﾠas	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠwith	 ﾠall	 ﾠhave	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠof	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmake	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠdissimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠJill’s	 ﾠfear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Jack	 ﾠwill	 ﾠget	 ﾠangry	 ﾠhas	 ﾠtriggers	 ﾠa	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠshe	 ﾠgets	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠat	 ﾠdetecting	 ﾠanger	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠfacial	 ﾠcues,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠmany	 ﾠfalse	 ﾠpositives	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway.
42	 ﾠHere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠon	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
fear	 ﾠis	 ﾠmediated	 ﾠan	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠanger	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠinput.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠan	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠ
process	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdidn’t	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠinput,	 ﾠJill’s	 ﾠfear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠJack	 ﾠwill	 ﾠget	 ﾠangry	 ﾠimproves	 ﾠher	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠmind	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠher	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠJack’s	 ﾠmind),	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠher	 ﾠgood	 ﾠat	 ﾠfiguring	 ﾠout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠmake	 ﾠhim	 ﾠ
angry.	 ﾠAnger-ﾭ‐beliefs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠfear	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠintuitively,	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠthat	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠ
checkered	 ﾠexperiences.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠautomatically	 ﾠ
exempt	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcheckering.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠoccasion,	 ﾠJill’s	 ﾠfear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠJack	 ﾠis	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
moment)	 ﾠangry	 ﾠat	 ﾠher	 ﾠpenetrates	 ﾠher	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠsees	 ﾠhim,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhe	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠangry	 ﾠto	 ﾠher.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠparadigm	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠcheckering	 ﾠ(exactly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpaper)	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
compatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠJill’s	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠequipped	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠreliable	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠto	 ﾠJack’s	 ﾠ
anger	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠacquired	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠfearing	 ﾠJack,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
physically	 ﾠabused	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠperceptually	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠanger.
43	 ﾠHer	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠ
learning	 ﾠmight	 ﾠmake	 ﾠher	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠinputs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠothers	 ﾠcouldn’t	 ﾠnotice,	 ﾠin	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
mushroom	 ﾠexpert	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠmushrooms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlook	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
novices,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠoccasion	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠher	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠfear,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠcues,	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
42	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsome	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠby	 ﾠemotion	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ
this.	 ﾠPollock	 ﾠand	 ﾠSinha	 ﾠ(2002)	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠphysically	 ﾠabused	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠ“accurately	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠfacial	 ﾠ
displays	 ﾠof	 ﾠanger	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠless	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠinput	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdid	 ﾠcontrols”,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexposure	 ﾠto	 ﾠthreats	 ﾠby	 ﾠadult	 ﾠcaretakers,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠget	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠat	 ﾠdetecting	 ﾠanger.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠalso	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠfalse	 ﾠpositives.	 ﾠ
43	 ﾠPollock	 ﾠand	 ﾠSinha	 ﾠ(2002),	 ﾠop	 ﾠcit.	 ﾠ22	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠare	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠher	 ﾠanger-ﾭ‐experience	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠsees	 ﾠJack.	 ﾠIllusion	 ﾠand	 ﾠveridical	 ﾠ
hallucination	 ﾠare	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠlearning.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠit,	 ﾠany	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠattention	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠseem	 ﾠexempt	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcheckering.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠattention,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠgaining	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠexpertise	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠ
become	 ﾠsalient.
44	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠby	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠseem	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠ
innocuous.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠprior	 ﾠmental	 ﾠstates	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠor	 ﾠattend	 ﾠto,	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠinfluencing	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠlook	 ﾠto	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠyou	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠmight	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
mere	 ﾠselection	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwant	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNecker	 ﾠcube	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduck-ﾭ‐rabbit	 ﾠto	 ﾠshift,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
shift	 ﾠby	 ﾠadjusting	 ﾠyour	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfigure,	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠaffecting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
your	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠsome	 ﾠselection	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠinnocuous.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpliers	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
black	 ﾠprime	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠattention	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠparts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpliers	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐like,	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠ
either	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐experience,	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐shape	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠcombines	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
background	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠrecognitional	 ﾠability).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠtask	 ﾠfor	 ﾠangry	 ﾠfaces,	 ﾠwhite	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠfind	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠblack	 ﾠangry	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠmore	 ﾠquickly	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfind	 ﾠwhite	 ﾠangry	 ﾠfaces.
45	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthese	 ﾠselections	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
stimuli	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠno	 ﾠillusion	 ﾠor	 ﾠdistortion	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠstimuli,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
misrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠscene	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠangry	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠare	 ﾠblack	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstimulus	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐like	 ﾠones.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠselection	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠcan	 ﾠturn	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠinto	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstrument	 ﾠof	 ﾠconfirmation	 ﾠbias.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠ
intrinsically	 ﾠbad,	 ﾠepistemologically,	 ﾠabout	 ﾠignoring	 ﾠsome	 ﾠstimuli	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
epistemological	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠsome	 ﾠselections	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ
epistemologically.	 ﾠ
Since	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhopes	 ﾠseem	 ﾠslim	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdefining	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpromising	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
processes	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠstructurally	 ﾠ
similar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠcontroversial	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠare	 ﾠparadigm	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠcheckering	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠ
here,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠillustrate	 ﾠa	 ﾠschema	 ﾠfor	 ﾠidentifying	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences.	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠwork	 ﾠbackwards	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠinnocuous	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠone	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠcompromising	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration.	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠan	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠis	 ﾠneither	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠnor	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcheckering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessary,	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠcheckering	 ﾠcan	 ﾠarise	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠconative	 ﾠstates	 ﾠalone	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠin	 ﾠwishful	 ﾠthinking),	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
(as	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsaw	 ﾠin	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ2).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠof	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
beliefs,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠany	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠTogether	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠ
experiences,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠentails	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠunjustified	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
checkered	 ﾠpast.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠan	 ﾠunjustified	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
sufficient	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcheckering,	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠyou	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠhawk,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
believing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgreatly	 ﾠimproves	 ﾠyour	 ﾠvisual	 ﾠacuity.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠis	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠa-ﾭ‐rational,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
resulting	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcheckered.	 ﾠ
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5.	 ﾠObjections	 ﾠand	 ﾠReplies	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ I	 ﾠnow	 ﾠturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDowngrade	 ﾠPrinciple.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠ
focus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠbegan.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠas	 ﾠlacking	 ﾠin	 ﾠjustification,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠcharges	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
penetration	 ﾠcould	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠcontroversial	 ﾠ
assumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠ‘high-ﾭ‐level’	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
embryo,	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun,	 ﾠa	 ﾠjar	 ﾠof	 ﾠmustard,	 ﾠor	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠangry.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Objection	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠReduced	 ﾠjustification,	 ﾠor	 ﾠmere	 ﾠobstacle	 ﾠto	 ﾠknowledge?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Upon	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐in-ﾭ‐the-ﾭ‐fridge,	 ﾠpreformationism,	 ﾠOuija	 ﾠboard,	 ﾠpliers/gun	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
anger	 ﾠexamples,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠreaction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠare	 ﾠsomehow	 ﾠ
epistemically	 ﾠworse	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠmustard-ﾭ‐experience,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠyou	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠlook	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠmustard	 ﾠin	 ﾠit	 ﾠby	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmustard.	 ﾠI’ve	 ﾠportrayed	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreaction	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
intuition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠthese	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠis	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠ
below	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbaseline	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠdowngraded.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ An	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠmight	 ﾠobject	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠover-ﾭ‐describing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreaction.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠvicinity,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral:	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠis	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠamiss	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠit	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠan	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperiences.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
checkered	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠdefeat	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
veridical	 ﾠhallucination,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠplain	 ﾠold	 ﾠhallucination	 ﾠof	 ﾠmustard	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠjust	 ﾠhappens	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠjar	 ﾠof	 ﾠmustard	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplace	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠyou	 ﾠ
hallucinate	 ﾠone	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠyou	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠyour	 ﾠhallucination,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwould	 ﾠend	 ﾠup	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwith	 ﾠknowledge.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjector,	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠ
prevents	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠveridical	 ﾠhallucination	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcounting	 ﾠas	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠalso	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration,	 ﾠand	 ﾠconstitutes	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠonly	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠshortcoming.	 ﾠCognitive	 ﾠ
penetration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠillustrated	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠintroduces	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠluck	 ﾠinto	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠto	 ﾠcount	 ﾠas	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠany	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
baseline	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠreply,	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠcompromise	 ﾠis	 ﾠstrictly	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompromise	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠveridical	 ﾠhallucination	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠGettier	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠproperly	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfacts.	 ﾠThen	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠonly	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠveridical	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠ
experiences,	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠto	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopponent,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠputatively	 ﾠjustifies	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠproperly	 ﾠ
connected	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠJack	 ﾠreally	 ﾠis	 ﾠangry,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠreally	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrestriction	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠ
compromise	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠcases	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠare	 ﾠfalse.	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowledge-ﾭ‐defeat	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomehow	 ﾠexpanded	 ﾠto	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
cases,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠaccommodate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠintuition.	 ﾠ
Intuitively,	 ﾠJill’s	 ﾠfear-ﾭ‐penetrated	 ﾠanger-ﾭ‐experience	 ﾠputs	 ﾠher	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠworse	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠposition	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
she	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠif	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠan	 ﾠuncheckered	 ﾠanger-ﾭ‐experience,	 ﾠall	 ﾠother	 ﾠthings	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠequal.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
Jack	 ﾠreally	 ﾠisn’t	 ﾠangry,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠJill	 ﾠcan’t	 ﾠknow	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠanger-ﾭ‐experience	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis,	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠher	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠintroduces	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠJill’s	 ﾠcheckered	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠputs	 ﾠ24	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
her	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠworse	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠposition,	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠuncheckered:	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠless	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠher	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
checkered,	 ﾠthan	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠher	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠisn’t.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Objection	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠHigh-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ At	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠI	 ﾠgave	 ﾠsix	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
penetration	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠall	 ﾠbut	 ﾠone	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠpenetrated	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠthan	 ﾠcolor,	 ﾠshape,	 ﾠmotion,	 ﾠillumination,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠan	 ﾠembryo,	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠmustard	 ﾠjar,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠangry.	 ﾠSomeone	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠproperties.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
represented	 ﾠin	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠmisdescribed,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠ
remains	 ﾠopen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠdowngraded	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
instance,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreformationism	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠconfiguration	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
variously	 ﾠilluminated	 ﾠlines	 ﾠand	 ﾠcolors,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠone	 ﾠmight	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
baseline	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠslide	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠfeatures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠreply,	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
visual	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠstill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconfigurations	 ﾠof	 ﾠless	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠ
trigger	 ﾠrepresentations	 ﾠof	 ﾠguns,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresent.	 ﾠCall	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
configurations	 ﾠof	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐gestalts.	 ﾠExperiences	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐gestalts	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐beliefs	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠof	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠor	 ﾠdispositions	 ﾠ
linking	 ﾠthose	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠto	 ﾠguns,	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscene	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun.
46	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpenetrating	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠend	 ﾠ
up	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcontents,	 ﾠand	 ﾠboth	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠ(such	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠJack	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠangry).
47	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠI’ve	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠworking	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
assumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠanother	 ﾠkind,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
penetrating	 ﾠstate	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpenetrating	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠ
contents	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠproperties,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpenetrating	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠfear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge	 ﾠcould	 ﾠpenetrate	 ﾠyour	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠby	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠ
gun-ﾭ‐gestalt	 ﾠcontents,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfear,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠhum-ﾭ‐drum	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge,	 ﾠ
your	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐complex	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠ(mustard-ﾭ‐jar-ﾭ‐gestalt	 ﾠcontents,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
example).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠcould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecognitional	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
46	 ﾠIn	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠterminology,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠjust	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐beliefs	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠlinking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠto	 ﾠguns.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
47	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreformationism	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠembryo,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
penetrating	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠspermcells	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠembryos.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmood	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠ
questionable	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmood	 ﾠhas	 ﾠany	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠ(perhaps	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
respond	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
discouragement),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠare	 ﾠpresumably	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠascribing	 ﾠ
colors	 ﾠto	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ25	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
disposition)	 ﾠlinking	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐gestalts	 ﾠto	 ﾠguns.	 ﾠAny	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠshortcoming	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
experience,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐misrecognition	 ﾠby	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐gestalt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Downgrade	 ﾠPrinciple	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpredict	 ﾠdowngrade	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpredict	 ﾠ
downgrade	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimpler	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpenetration.	 ﾠA	 ﾠhope	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠa	 ﾠfear)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfridge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmorphed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐belief	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠwishful	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠfearful)	 ﾠ
thinking,	 ﾠand	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwould	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐founded.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐gestalt	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠunjustified	 ﾠgun-ﾭ‐belief,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ




In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠI’ve	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠother	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunfold	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasement,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠplace	 ﾠin	 ﾠassessing	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠas	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠor	 ﾠunjustified.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠfoundationalism	 ﾠin	 ﾠepistemology	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠencouraged	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠappraisals	 ﾠtrace	 ﾠback	 ﾠno	 ﾠfarther	 ﾠthan	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠ
Any	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠleading	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthought,	 ﾠare	 ﾠmere	 ﾠrumblings	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasement	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠirrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠstanding.	 ﾠI’ve	 ﾠattempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthose	 ﾠideas,	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
focusing	 ﾠon	 ﾠetiologies	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdeserve	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠirrational,	 ﾠand	 ﾠarguing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠetiology	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠdowngrade.	 ﾠMost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠdefending	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠ
takes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠhow	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠleading	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠ
assessable	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunfold	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
basement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠones	 ﾠthat	 ﾠculminate	 ﾠin	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
cognitive	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠof	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠdoxastically	 ﾠ
unjustified	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway,	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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